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AUDITORS WHISTLE AN UNHAPPY TUNE
JEANNE CALDERON*

RACHEL KowAm!

INTRODUCTION

The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (Reform Act)'
contains a provision which requires auditors to detect fraudulent financial reporting and illegal acts and to report such illegal acts in their audit
procedures. 2 Auditors now seemingly have an obligation to whistle blow
on their clients. This represents a significant departure from existing judicial and professional auditing standards in terms of auditors' potential
fraud liability.
Before the adoption of the Reform Act, auditors' responsibilities in
this area were governed by Generally Accepted Auditing Standards
(GAAS) issued by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) and judicial decisions under section 10(b) of the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act).'
Two auditing standards issued prior to the passage of the Reform
Act are critical: (1) Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 53 entitled "The Auditors' Responsibility to Detect and Report Errors and Irregularities" and (2) SAS No. 54 entitled "Illegal Acts by Clients."

* Assistant Professor of Business Law, Stem School of Business, New York University,
New York, B.A., Cornell University, 1975; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 1978.
f Assistant Professor of Business Law, Stem School of Business, New York University,
New York, B.A., Cornell University, 1977; J.D., Benjamin Cardozo School of Law, 1981.
1. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified as additions and amendments to 15 U.S.C. §§ 77-78 and 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (Supp. I 1995))
[hereinafter Reform Act].
2. Reform Act sec. 301(a), § 10A, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (Supp. I 1995) (amending the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1994)).
3. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)(1994). The full text of section 10(b)
makes it unlawful for any person:
[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a
national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
4. AMERICAN INSTrurrE OF CERTmIED PuBLIc AccouNTANTs (AICPA), CODIFICATION OF
STATEMENTS ON AUDITING STANDARDS § 316.03 (1995) (codifying AUDrrING STANDARDS BOARD,
STATEMENT ON AuDITNG STANDARDS No. 53 (1988)) [hereinafter SAS NO. 53]. The STATEMENT
ON AUDmNG STANDARDS consists of standards promulgated by the AICPA's Auditing Standards
Board for future assimilation into the CODnncArnON OF STATEMENTS ON AUDITING STANDARDS.
419
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Shortly after the enactment of the Reform Act, in SAS No. 82 entitled
"Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit," the AICPA
promulgated new guidance on auditors' responsibilities to detect fraud in
conducting a financial statement audit.'
Unlike the Reform Act's whistle blower provision, neither SAS No.
54 nor SAS No. 82 requires the auditor to make a public disclosure of a
client's wrongdoing, although SAS No. 82 refers to the Reform Act's
disclosure requirement as a circumstance in which public disclosure of
illegal acts by the auditor may be required. Although the Accounting
Standards Board (ASB) formed its fraud task force to develop SAS No.
82 long before the Reform Act was enacted9 and does not consider SAS
No. 82 to be a response to the Reform Act,"0 there appears to be an unmistakable relationship between the legislation and these professional
auditing standards.
Furthermore, auditors' whistle blower responsibilities have been
defined and developed in a growing body of judicial decisions adjudicating securities fraud claims under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act."
Securities fraud litigation has proven to be quite costly to the accounting
profession which was one of the Reform Act's earliest and strongest advocates. 2 The accounting profession heavily lobbied for such provisions
of the Reform Act as the safe harbor for forward-looking information,'3
the heightened pleading requirements for alleging securities fraud,"' the

5. AMERcAN INsTnurE op CERTwiED PuBic AccouNTANTs, CODIFICATION Op
STATEMENTS ON AUDITING STANDARDS § 317.08 (1995) [hereinafter AU].
6. AuDrrING STANDARDS BOARD, STATEMENT ON AUDITING STANDARDS No. 82,
CONSIDERATION OF FRAUD INA FINANCIAL STATEMENT AuDrr (1997) (superseding SAS No. 53,
effective for audits of financial statements for periods ending on or after December 15, 1997)
[hereinafter SAS No. 82].
7. Id.
8. Id. at 140; see infra Part HUB.
9. Jane Mancino, The Auditor and Fraud,J. OF ACCOUNTANCY, Apr. 1997, at 32 (noting the
AICPA board of directors, in its June 1993 report, supported the recommendation of the Public
Oversight Board (POB) of the AICPA division for CPA firms, SEC practice section, to undertake
initiatives to detect and prevent fraud, particularly in financial statements).
10. See PuBLIc OVERSIGHT BOARD oF THE SEC PRACrIcE SECrION OF THE AICPA, IN THE
PUBUC INTEREST (Mar. 5, 1993) (special report); Board of Directors of the AICPA, Meeting the
Financial Reporting Needs of the Future: A Public Commitment from the Public Accounting
Profession,J. OF ACCOUNTING, Aug. 1993, at 17; Mancino, supranote 9, at 32.
11. See generally Robert A. Prentice, Locating that "Indistinct" and "Virtually Nonexistent"
Line Between Primary and Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b), 75 N.C. L. REV. 691 (1997)
(providing extensive analysis of court treatment of section 10(b)).
12. Harvey L. Pitt & David B. Hardison, For Outside Accountants, the New Obligations
Imposed by the Securities LitigationReform Act Go Way Beyond ClassicalGAAS, NAT'L LJ., Mar.
25, 1996, at B4 (discussing the accounting profession's active role in lobbying for the Reform Act).
13. See Reform Act sec. 102(a), § 27A, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2 (Supp. 1 1995) (adding a safe
harbor provision to the Securities Act of 1933); Reform Act sec. 102(b), § 21E, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5
(adding a safe harbor provision to the Exchange Act).
14. Reform Act sec. 101(b), § 21D(b)(2). 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2).
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elimination of joint and several liability" and the adoption of a modified

system of proportionate liability for securities fraud cases."
In 1992, securities fraud litigation costs for the six largest accounting firms accounted for $783 million or more than 14% of their audit
revenues, and today these firms face billions of dollars in securities fraud
claims.' The Big Six accounting firms'" are more aggressively protecting
themselves by dumping audit clients that they deem to be a high risk for
generating costly securities fraud litigation over allegedly faulty audits.'9
According to Dan Guy, vice president of professional standards and
services at the AICPA, "[miore than ever, accounting firms don't want to
expose themselves to clients who will harm their reputations or generate
costly litigation."'
This may be especially true in light of a recent empirical study conducted by Stanford University Law School Professors Grundfest and
Perino (Grundfest study) of class action securities fraud litigation which
were filed during calendar year 1996, the first year that the Reform Act
took effect.2' It concluded that "allegations of accounting irregularities or
trading by insiders now explain the lion's share of federal class action
litigation.""' According to the Grundfest study, the frequency of accounting-driven allegations in post-Reform Act complaints has decidedly
increased.23 This increase may be attributed to the Reform Act's height15. Reform Act sec. 201(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(g)(2)(A) (adding § 21D(g) to the Reform Act's
amendments established by the addition of section 101).
16. Reform Act sec. 201(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(g)(2)(B).
17. George B. Yankwitt & Susan A. Moldovan, Reform Act: Panacea or Paper Tiger for
Accountants and Auditors?, N.Y. L.J., June 27, 1996, at 1, 1 n.2 (citing PrivateLitigation Under the
Federal Securities Laws: HearingsBefore the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. No. 103-431 (1993) (statement of
Jake L. Netterville), reprintedin Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1696, § 407 (Jan. 10, 1996)).
18. The "Big Six" accounting firms consist of Arthur Andersen, Coopers & Lybrand, Deloitte
& Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG Peat Marwick, and Price Waterhouse. Elizabeth MacDonald,
More Accounting Firms Are Dumping Risky Clients, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 1997, at A2.
19. Id. (recognizing that the Big Six accounting firms have dropped 30 publicly traded
companies as audit clients from January through April, 1997, 92 such clients in 1996, 68 clients in
1995, and 85 clients in 1994).
20. Id.
21. Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A. Perino, Securities LitigationReform: The First Year's
Experience, in SECURITIES LITIGATION 1997, at 955 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 1015, 1997).
22. Id. at 959.
23. The Grundfest study stated:
[O]ne of the most common forms of fraud alleged in the sixty-five [Post-Reform Act
federal] complaints analyzed are misrepresentations or omissions in financial statements
which appear in 58.5% of the complaints. Thirty complaints (or 79% of those alleging
false and misleading financial statements) allege a violation of Generally Accepted
Accounting
Principles (GAAP).
Of the thirty-eight
complaints alleging
misrepresentations or omissions in financial statements, thirty-six (or 95%) allege
improperly recorded sales, revenues, or earnings. Allegations of misstated financials
account for 67.4% of the forty-six complaints that are based solely on alleged section
10(b) violations.
Grndfest & Perino, supra note 21, at 973.
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ened pleading requirement that plaintiffs "state with particularity facts
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind."' Plaintiffs may believe that by making particular
allegations involving misrepresentations or omissions in financial statements or violations of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP), courts will more likely find that they have met their pleading
requirements for fraud.'
Two new studies indicate that the number of securities fraud class
action suits filed in federal court during 1997 have reached the high levels of the early 1990s despite the Reform Act's efforts to curb such lawsuits.' Plaintiff's lawyers have also returned to federal court after making
adjustments to the higher pleading standards and other barriers, such as
the new safe harbor provision for forward-looking statements," created
by the Reform Act. The number of shareholder lawsuits filed in state
courts, previously viewed as a more amenable forum for such lawsuits,
was down sharply in 1997.'
This article discusses the current legal issues pertaining to the auditors' duty to detect fraud and illegal acts and disclose such illegal acts
under the Reform Act, professional auditing standards and court decisions. Part I provides the judicial framework for auditors' duty to whistle
blow on their client's illegal activities. Part II describes auditors' statutorily prescribed duty to detect fraudulent and illegal acts and report illegal
acts pursuant to the Reform Act and auditing standards promulgated by
the accounting profession. Part ImI delineates the legal standards plaintiffs
must meet to properly plead that auditors have committed securities
fraud. Part IV assesses the current legal environment that auditors are
working within and suggests a future course for auditors facing fraud
liability.
I.

JUDICIAL BASIS FOR AuDITORS' DUTY TO DISCLOSE

An auditor's whistle blowing duty was recognized by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Arthur Young & Co.,' where the Court, while
denying a federal law privilege for independent auditors' workpapers,
stated:
An independent certified public accountant performs a different role
[than an attorney whose job is to serve the client]. By certifying the
24. Reform Act sec. 101(b), § 21D(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (Supp. I 1995).
25. Grundfest & Perino, supra note 21, at 974.
26. Dean Starkman, Securities Class-Action Lawsuits Make Comeback in Federal Court,
WALL ST. J., July 9, 1997, at B4 (discussing two studies performed by the National Economic
Research Associates Inc., a White Plains, N.Y., consulting firm, and the Securities Class Action
Clearinghouse, a research project run by Stanford University Law School).
27. Reform Act sec. 101(b), § 21D(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2).
28. Starkman, supra note 26, at B4.
29. 465 U.S. 805 (1984).
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public reports that collectively depict a corporation's financial status,
the independent auditor assumes a public responsibility transcending
any employment relationship with the client. The independent public
accountant performing this special function owes ultimate allegiance
to the corporation's creditors and stockholders, as well as to the investing public. This "public watchdog" function demands that the accountant maintain total independence from the client at all times and
requires complete fidelity to the public trust. 0
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has reiterated this
duty3' enunciated by the Supreme Court. Congress codified this approach
by enacting the Reform Act's whistle blower provision.
Shareholder securities fraud actions are generally brought under
section 10(b) 32 of the Exchange Act which makes it unlawful "[t]o use or
employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security... any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance ... The SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5, ' commonly known as the general anti-fraud provision prohibiting fraudulent activity in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security, in order to implement section 10(b). Most shareholder lawsuits also allege section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 violations since
federal law implicitly, but not expressly, recognizes a private civil cause
of action under these sections.' As will be discussed below, however,
under the Reform Act auditors are specifically protected from private
causes of action for any reports of illegal acts by management that are
reported to the SEC.
To maintain a securities fraud cause of action under Rule lOb-5, the
plaintiff must prove five elements: (a) the defendant made a false state-

30. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. at 817-18.
31. In re American Finance Co., 40 S.E.C. 1043,1049 (1962).
32. Grundfest & Perino, supra note 21, at 973 (stating that review of sixty-five post-Reform
Act federal court complaints alleging fraud found that forty-six of the complaints were based solely
on section 10(b) violations).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
34. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1997).
35. Rule lOb-5 states in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly ... (b) [t]o make any untrue
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading... in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
36. In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, the Court stated:
Although sec. 10(b) does not by its terms create an express civil remedy for its violation,
and there is no indication that Congress or the Commission when adopting Rule lob-5,
contemplated such a remedy, the existence of a private cause of action for violations of
the statute and the Rule is now well established.
425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976) (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730
(1975)); see also R. Douglas Martin, Basic Inc. v. Levinson: The Supreme Court'sAnalysis of Fraud
on the Market and Its Impact on the Reliance Requirement of SEC Rule lOb-5, 78 KY. L.J. 403, 405407 (1990).
37. Reform Act sec. 301(a), § IOA(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(c).
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ment or omission; (b) of a material fact; (c) with scienter; (d) in connection with the purchase or sale of securities; (e) upon which the plaintiff
reasonably relied; and (f) that reliance proximately caused damages
The Rule lOb-5 requirements mirror the elements of the common law
tort action of deceit.39
The federal securities laws provide that there is no general duty to
speak and "silence, absent a duty to disclose, is not misleading under
Rule lOb-5."' Most courts have held that mere silence or inaction will
not even give rise to secondary securities fraud liability as an aider and
abettor under section 10(b) and Rule IOb-5 of the Exchange Act.'
Prior to the 1994 Supreme Court decision rendered in CentralBank
v. First Interstate Bank,43 courts held that section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
impose liability not only on those who themselves commit fraud, but also
upon those who assist, aid, and abet, others who do so. " According to a
majority of courts, aiding and abetting liability existed if someone committed a primary violation, the alleged abettor had knowledge of the
wrong and his role in it, and the alleged abettor substantially assisted in
the violation. '5 In CentralBank, the Supreme Court eliminated the most
common approach to suing secondary defendants by eliminating aiding
and abetting liability under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. ' The Central
Bank decision has been viewed as a tremendous legal victory for accountants and other professionals since now they only face securities
liability as primary violators. Congress chose not to overrule Central
Bank under the Reform Act, although the statute authorizes the SEC to
proceed with civil administrative actions against those who aid and abet
a securities fraud. '7

38. Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., 51 F.3d 1329, 1331 (7th Cir. 1995); Huddleston v.
Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534,543 (5th Cir. 1981); Rehm v. Eagle Fin. Co., 654 F. Supp. 1246,
1250-51 (N.D. 111.1997); James J. Armstrong et al., Securities Fraud,33 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 973,
976-83 (1996) (discussing in detail these fraud elements); Julie A. Herzog, Fraud Created the
Market and an UnwarrantedExtension of Section 10(B) and Rule lob-5, 63 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
359, 360 (1995).
39. Martin, supra note 36, at 408; see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 105, at 728 (5th ed. 1984).

40. Dileo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624,628 (7th Cir. 1990).
41. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,238 n.17 (1988).
42. See, e.g., Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 490-94 (4th Cir. 1991); Robin v. Arthur
Young & Co., 915 F.2d 1120, 1125-26 (7th Cir. 1990); Dileo, 901 F.2d at 628-29; Latigo Ventures
v. Laventhal & Horwath, 876 F.2d 1322, 1327 (7th Cir. 1989); Prentice, supra note 11, at 761 &
n.314.
43. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
44. Daniel R. Fischel, Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934,
69 CAL. L. REV. 80, 80-85 (1981); see, e.g., Dileo, 901 F.2d at 628.
45. See, e.g., SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1311 (9th Cir. 1982).
46. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 191.
47. Reform Act sec. 104(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(f) (Supp. 11995).
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. Prior to the Reform Act, courts did not take a consistent approach as
to whether auditors have a duty to report fraud to third parties.' In some
cases where auditors had been sued for aiding and abetting liability under
Rule lOb-5, courts found that accountants had no duty to blow the whistle on their clients unless a law imposed such a duty or if the accountant
certified financial statements with knowledge of their material falsity.49
[I]f an accountant does not issue a public opinion about a company,
although it may have conducted internal audits or reviews for portions of the company, the accountant cannot subsequently be held responsible for the company's public statements issued later merely because the accountant may know those statements are likely untrue.w
According to the Seventh Circuit, accountants owe a duty to exercise
reasonable care in discharging their professional obligations to provide
accurate and adequate financial statements, but they do not owe a
broader duty to "search and sing" out fraud." Imposing primary fraud
liability upon accountants for failing to disclose would create adverse
consequences in the accountant-client relationship: clients would (1) not
repose in accountants the trust necessary to encourage accurate audits;
(2) withhold documents if they feared such access would lead to destructive or misunderstood disclosure; and (3) face increased accounting costs
as accountants raised their fees to cover anticipated liabilities. 2
The Eleventh and Ninth Circuits, unlike the Seventh Circuit, recognized the possibility of such a duty where the auditor has actual knowledge of the fraud and allows its name to be used in its client's offering
memoranda. 3 In Rudolph v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,' the Eleventh Circuit
found a duty to disclose where the auditor's audit reports were believed to
be accurate when first included in its client's private placement offering
memorandum, but learned subsequently that the partnership's funds were
not used for the purposes initially stated in the offering and failed to cure
any public misapprehension about the partnership's situation." According
to the Eleventh Circuit standards, an auditor may have a duty to blow the

48. See Edward Brodsky, The Auditor's New Duty to Blow the Whistle on Its Client, N.Y. L.J.,
June 12, 1996, at 3.
49. In re Cascade Int'l Sec. Litig., 894 F. Supp. 437, 442 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
50. Cascade Int'l, 894 F. Supp. at 443.
51. Dileo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing Latigo Ventures v.
Laventhol & Horwath, 876 F.2d 1322, 1327 (7th Cir. 1989)).
52. Dileo, 901 F.2d at 629.
53. See Prentice, supra note 11, at 761-68 (discussing various judicial approaches to the
accountant's duty to blow the whistle on its client's fraudulent activities).
54. 800F.2d 1040 (llth Cir. 1986).
55. Rudolph, 800 F.2d at 1044. The Rudolph court found the existence of a duty, reasoning that
"[sitanding idly by while one's good name is being used to perpetuate a fraud is inherently misleading."
Id. Furthermore, "[ilt is not unreasonable to expect an accountant, who stands in a 'special relationship of
trust vis-a-vis the public' and whose 'duty is to safeguard the public interest,' to disclose fraud in this type
of circumstance." Id. (internal citations omitted) (quoting Gold v. DCL Inc., 399 F. Supp. 1123, 1127
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) and In re Touche, Niven, Bailey & Smart, 37 S.E.C. 629,670 (1957)).
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whistle on its client's fraud when the auditor (1) possesses superior information than that of the investors; (2) incurs minimal costs from fraud disclosures; and (3) exposes investors to potentially enormous costs by failing
to make such disclosures.'
A five-part test has been applied by the Ninth Circuit in Roberts v.
Peat,Marwick, Mitchell & Co. 7 and several other courts indetermining
an auditor's duty to disclose his client's fraud." The five factors considered are: (1) the defendant's relationship to the plaintiff; (2) a comparison of the defendant's and the plaintiff's access to information; (3) benefits obtained by the defendant from his relationship with the plaintiff; (4)
defendant's awareness of plaintiff's reliance; and (5) defendant's involvement in initiating the securities transaction. 9
In Roberts, the Ninth Circuit held that Peat Marwick may have had
a duty to disclose as a secondary aider and abettor violator of section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5.' Peat Marwick's consent to the use of its name on
reports and offering memoranda that it knew were fraudulent could give
rise to a duty to disclose fraud especially where the accountant possessed
superior information and the cost to the accountant of disclosure was
minimal.6 ' The Roberts court applied the five-part test to find no duty to
disclose by a co-defendant law firm that was retained only to determine
marketable title by reviewing the title records, omitted information which
had nothing to do with marketability of title, provided equal access to
information and did not initiate the securities transactions.62
In In re American Continental Corp.ILincoln Savings and Loan,'
auditors were held to a stringent whistle blowing standard." The court
indicated that when auditors stand around in silence while knowing of
their client's fraud this may constitute "substantial assistance" of that
fraud even if the auditors had never completed their audits, never issued
a report and were not named in any SEC filed document.' However, an
opposite result was reached in Allard v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,' where
56. Id. at 1044-45; see alsoIn re Rospatch Sec. Litig., 760 F. Supp. 1239,1251 (V.D. Mich. 1991)
(following the Rudolph standard).
57. 857 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1988).
58. Roberts, 857 F.2d at 653-54; see also Pegasus Fund, Inc. v. Laraneta, 617 F.2d 1335, 1340 (9th
Cir. 1980); First Va. Bankshares v. Benson, 559 F.2d 1307, 1314 (5th Cir. 1977); Prentice, supra note 11,
at 764-65 & n.332 (citing Camp v.Dema, 948 F.2d 455,460 (8th Cir. 1991)); cf.Arthur Young & Co. v.
Reves, 937 F.2d 1310, 1330-31 (8th Cir. 1991) (providing a different articulation of the five elements),
affdsubnon. Reves v. Ernst& Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993).
59. Roberts, 857 F.2d at 653-54.
60. Id. at 653, rev'g in part Roberts v. Heim, 670 F. Supp. 1466, 1482, 1497 (N.D. Cal. 1987)
(reversing the district court's dismissal of an aiding and abetting claim for failure to state a claim).
61. Id.
62. Id at 653-54.
63. 794 F. Supp. 1424 (D. Ariz. 1992).
64. American ContinentalCorp.lLincoln Sav. & Loan Sec. Litig., 794 F. Supp. at 1442.
65. Id. at 1442-46.
66. 924 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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the court stated that "[a]lthough accountants may have a duty to 'correct
their own statements which later become false or misleading,' an accountant's mere possession of non public information as to client misconduct does not necessarily give rise to a duty to disclose." 7
Several scholars argue that the whistle blowing duties judicially
imposed upon auditors in these earlier cases do not survive the abolition
of secondary aiding and abetting Rule lOb-5 liability in the Central Bank
decision ' unless an independent duty to disclose is created by professional accounting standards.' In one post-CentralBank case, In re ZZZZ
Best Securities Litigation," the court allowed a primary liability lawsuit
to proceed against the auditor based upon the auditor's duty to withdraw
or disclose its client's misstatements due to the public's reliance upon its
previously reported information.7
Securities fraud suits against auditors frequently have included
claims alleging violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).' Inclusion of such a claim in an auditor liability
action subjects the auditor to treble damages." In Reves v. Ernst &
Young, " however, the Supreme Court limited auditor liability under
RICO, adopting a narrow interpretation of the relevant liability section. '5
Furthermore, in the Reform Act, Congress eliminated violations of the
federal securities laws as predicate acts under RICO. 6
Of course, as discussed below, duties to detect fraudulent reporting
and report illegal acts have now been statutorily created in the Reform
Act and professionally promulgated in new auditing standards." However, judicial decisions continue to provide a framework for determining
under what circumstances a duty to disclose will be found. This is especially true in light of ambiguities created under the Reform Act and the
professional auditing standards. In the face of ambiguity in the language
set forth in the Reform Act and the professional auditing standards,

67. Allard, 924 F. Supp. at 492 (internal citation omitted) (quoting In re MTC Elec. Tech.
Shareholders Utig., 898 F. Supp. 974,988 (E.D.N.Y. 1995)).
68. James D. Hansen & Michael J. Garrison, The Significance of "Central Bank" on Auditor
Liability,54 OmIo CPA J., 20, 20-23 (1995); Prentice, supra note 11, at 765; cf ischel, supra note 44, at
103 (proposing that the courts should eliminate secondary liability and, therefore, the "whistle blowing"
theory of liability, but preceding the CentralBank decision).
69. Hansen & Garrison, supra note 68, at 23; see Prentice, supra note 11, at 765.
70. 864 F. Supp. 960 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
71. Z
Best Sec. Litig., 864 F. Supp. at 976 (denying, in part, defendant's motion for summary
judgement).
72. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 1964(b) (Supp. 1 1995); see. e.g.,
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993) (involving both securities fraud and RICO claims brought
against accountants).
73. Reform Act sec. 107, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (Supp. 11995).
74. 507 U.S. 170 (1993).
75. Reves, 507 U.S. at 182-83.
76. Reform Act sec. 107, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
77. See infraPart IL
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auditors may resort to judicial decisions, as well as legislative history, for
future guidance.
II. STATUTORY DUTY AND PROFESSIONAL AUDITING STANDARDS FOR
DETECTING FRAUDULENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSING ILLEGAL ACTs

A. The Reform Act
Section 10A of the Reform Act specifies procedures to be followed
by auditors in connection with the discovery and subsequent reporting of
fraudulent financial reporting and illegal acts."8 Accountants are required
to include in their audits:
(1) procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance of detecting
illegal acts that would have a direct and material effect on the determination of financial statement amounts; (2) procedures designed to
identify related party transactions that are material to the financial
statements or otherwise require disclosure therein; and (3) an evaluation of whether there is substantial doubt about the ability of the issuer to continue as a going concern during the ensuing fiscal year.79
If an auditor determines that an illegal act has or may have occurred,
then the Reform Act requires the auditor. (1) to make a determination as
to the likelihood that the illegal act has in fact occurred;'m (2) if so, to
determine the possible effect on the issuer's financial statements, giving
consideration to any contingent effects such as fines, penalties, and damages; and (3) to inform management. If management does not take
"timely and appropriate remedial action" and the auditor determines that
the illegal acts will have a material effect on the client's financial statements by being clearly not inconsequential, the auditor is required to
report this information to the client's board of directors or the board's
audit committee.
This provision does not refer to disclosure of fraudulent acts although the title of the provision is "Fraud Detection and Disclosure."'
Furthermore, the Reform Act does not define the meaning of the phrase
"timely and appropriate remedial action." Thus, the auditor must use his
discretion in this regard. The failure to take remedial action may reasonably warrant the auditor's resignation or departure from a standard
audit report.'

78. Reform Act sec. 301(a), § 10A(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(a) to (b) (Supp. 1 1995).
79. Reform Act sec. 301(a), § 10A(a) to (b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(a).
80. Reform Act sec. 301(a), § 10A(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(b)(1)(A)(i).
81. Reform Act sec. 301(a), § 1OA(b)(1)(A)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(bXl)(AXii).
82. Reform Act sec. 301(a), § 10A(b)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(b)(l)(B)
83. Reform Act sec. 301(a), § 1OA(bX2), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(b)(2).
84. Reform Act sec. 301, 109 Stat. 737,762 (1995).
85. Pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933, the SEC imposes detailed requirements for reporting a
change in accountants in item 304 of Regulation S-K. 17 C.F.R. § 229.304 (1997). Item 304 requires the
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Pursuant to the Reform Act, the company must then inform the SEC
not later than one business day after receipt of the report and must give
the auditor a copy of the notice that has been sent to the SEC. If the
company fails to give such notice, even if the auditor elects to resign, the
auditor still must furnish a copy of its report to the SEC within one business day.' This provision has been pejoratively referred to as the "whistle blower provision."' Although the SEC's Regulation S-K already requires the company to report any alleged impropriety or illegality," the
Reform Act now clearly requires the auditor to make such a disclosure.!
As our discussion of the applicable auditing standards will emphasize,
SAS No. 54 and SAS No. 82 do not require the auditor to make a public
disclosure.9 ' Pursuant to those standards, if the auditor detects fraudulent
acts, and the client refuses to take corrective action, the auditor need not
make a disclosure to the SEC or to any other party, but simply must
withdraw from the engagement.' Nonetheless, SAS No. 82 refers to the
Reform Act's disclosure requirement as a circumstance in which public
disclosure of illegal acts by the auditor may be required.93
An auditor could face direct fraud liability pertaining to matters
found but not included in the report and an auditor found to have "willfully violated" the statute by failing to make the required disclosures will
be liable for civil penalties." However, the Reform Act provides the
auditor with protection from liability ina private action for any "finding,
conclusion, or statement expressed in a report" received by the SEC. No
implied private right of action is provided by the Reform Act," but the
statute does not eliminate the preexisting implied private right of action
pursuant to Rule 10b-5. Nothing in the Reform Act or its legislative history supports such elimination. The conference report to the bill that became the Reform Act provides that "[p]rivate securities litigation is an
indispensable tool with which defrauded investors can recover their
company to report a change of accountant, as well as four categories of "reportable events" which include
that the auditor has advised the company that the internal controls needed to develop reliable financial
statements do not exist or that the auditor has determined that he can no longer rely on management
representations. 17 C.F.R. § 2 29.304(a)(1). Pursuant to the Exchange Act, the SEC requires this
information to be discussed in item 4 of Form 8-K. Item 304 also requires the issuer to provide the former
auditor with a copy of the disclosure and request that the former auditor furnish the SEC with a letter
stating whether the auditor agrees with the disclosures and, if not, stating the matter on which there is
disagreement Id. § 229.304(a)(3).
86. Reform Act sec. 301(a), § IOA(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(b)(3).
87. Reform Act sec. 301(a), § IOA(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(b)(4).
88. Karen Donovan, Bean Counters in a Bind: Trade-off Expands Duties, NAT'L U., Apr. 29,
1996, at BI.
89. 17 C.F.R. § 229.304.
90. Reform Act sec. 301(a), § IOA(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-I(b).
91. See infra notes 110-77 and accompanying text
92. SAS No. 82, supra note 6,at 40; AU, supra note 5,at § 317.18-.20,.23.
93. SAS NO. 82, supra note 6, at 40.
94. Reform Act sec. 301(a), § IOA(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-I(d).
95. Reform Act sec. 301(a), § IOA(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-!(c).
96. Reform Act sec. 203, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 note (Construction).
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losses without having to rely upon government action." Many of the
Reform Act's other provisions, including the ones that change the joint
and several liability rules, indicate that Congress had no intention of
eliminating the implied right of action.
The issue arises as to what happens if the auditor reports an alleged
illegal act to the SEC and he turns out to be wrong. Obviously, the company's stock price will be affected. In addition, the future relationship of
the auditor and the company will be affected and probably destroyed."
As set forth above, however, the Reform Act provides that the auditor
will not be subject to liability in a private action for such a mistake." In a
1993 hearing on this provision, Representative Markey, one of its sponsors, stated that this provision "[was] designed to protect auditors [who]
comply with the reporting requirements of the bill from exposure to private litigation."' "® Representative Markey went on to state that "we create[d] a whistle blower safe harbor for the auditor as he or she goes to the
SEC so that they don't feel as though they are going to be necessarily
exposing themselves to additional legal ramifications if they do so."''
In addition, the potential for auditor exposure to liability still exists
even if he issues an adverse opinion or disclaims an opinion on the financial statements. A plaintiff can argue that once the auditor was in a
position to know that management was not taking appropriate remedial
actions in response to a significant fraudulent or illegal act, such as reporting the matter to an appropriate governmental agency, the law required the auditor to notify the directors and make sure that they notified
the SEC. By not so reporting, the auditor arguably allowed the illegal act
to continue unabated, thereby increasing the financial damage to the
company and providing insufficient warning to investors.
Finally, the Reform Act may expose auditors to increased litigation
for failure to discover and disclose illegal acts other than management
fraud.'" These situations could expose auditors to securities fraud law-

97. H.R. CoNF.REP. No. 104-369, at 31(1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,730.
98. While the Reform Act provides a safe harbor from liability for any auditor who makes a report
to the SEC pursuant to the Reform Act section 301, § 10A(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(c), this statutory
provision may compel companies to publicly disclose defenses to alleged illegal actions in a very short
time frame and with incomplete knowledge of the underlying facts at issue.
99. Reform Act sec. 301(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(c).
100. Financial Fraud Detection: Hearings on H.R. 574 Before the Subcommittee on
Telecommunications and Finance of the House of Representatives Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1993) (opening statement of Representative Markey).
101. Id. at 85 (response of Representative Markey to questions following the presentation of H.R.
574).
102. Robert Sidorsky, Auditor's Duty to Blow the Whistle Under the Litigation Reform Act, N.Y.
LJ., Feb. 9, 1996, at 1,7.
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suits based upon direct primary liability under Rule lOb-5.1 °3 As stated
above, section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 impose a duty to disclose a misleading omission. The Reform Act's disclosure requirement arguably
runs to investors. Therefore, it seems reasonable to argue that an auditor's breach of a duty to blow the whistle on his client will give rise to
Rule lOb-5 liability.
The Cronos Group has become the first company whose outside
accounting firm, Arthur Andersen, applied this new whistle blower provision of the Reform Act.'" Cronos, a Luxembourg corporation based in
England, manages fleets of shipping containers and was a sponsor of
more than $400 million in limited partnerships investing in containers.
Arthur Andersen found what it believed to be illegal activity and,
after informing the board of directors (which did not provide the accounting firm with an adequate explanation, refused to investigate the
matter, and did not cause "senior management to take timely and appropriate remedial actions with respect to these matters"), submitted a report, which Cronos filed with the SEC in February, 1997, as required by
the Reform Act." Arthur Andersen simultaneously resigned as Cronos's
auditor.'"
According to Arthur Andersen's report, the accounting firm
questioned a $1.5 million dollar "disbursement."'" That disbursement,
along with subsequent correspondence from Cronos's bank concerning
the repayment of the disbursement to the company "may have violated
laws and regulations to which the [clompany is subject including U.S.
securities laws, and that these matters may have a material effect upon
the 1996 financial statements of the [c]ompany."'
As of this date, we are not aware of any other accounting firm that
has applied this new whistle blower provision. Furthermore, to date, the
SEC has had only limited experience with section 1OA because the new
provision becomes effective in two stages. For companies that file selected quarterly financial data with the SEC, section 1OA applies to annual reports for fiscal years beginning on or after January 1, 1996. For

103. After the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164
(1994), accountants no longer face secondary liability under Rule lOb-5 for aiding and abetting their
clients' securities fraud violations. See infra Part .
104. Letter from Arthur Andersen to the Board of Directors for the Cronos Group (Feb. 3, 1997)
(visited Nov. 14, 1997) <htp://www.sec.gov/Archivesledgar/data/912605/0000950149-97-000229.txt>
[hereinafter Andersen Letter]. This letter was submitted to the SEC as required by the Reform Act section
301(a), § IOA(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(bX4).
105. Andersen Letter, supra note 104.
106. I&
107. Id
108. Id.
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companies that do not file these reports, the provision applies to annual
reports for fiscal years beginning on or after January 1, 1997."
B. GAAS Requirements: SAS No. 82 and SAS No. 54
Although the Reform Act's new section 10A is entitled "Fraud Detection and Disclosure," much of it is worded in terms of disclosure of
"illegal acts."" Section 10A(f) defines an "illegal act" as "an act or
omission that violates any laws, or any rule or regulation having the
force of law.""' Management fraud typically does involve illegal acts,
such as violation of securities and tax laws, money laundering, embezzlement, bribery and price fixing.
However, the terms "fraud," "illegal acts," "errors," and "irregularities" also are terms of art in the auditing community. As stated earlier,
the Reform Act's new statutory provision must be discussed in conjunction with two auditing standards: (1) SAS No. 82, entitled "Consideration
Audit,""2 and (2) SAS No. 54, entitled
of Fraud in a Financial Statement
'" 3
Clients."
"Illegal Acts by
1. SASNo. 82
The enactment of SAS No. 82 is a result of the AICPA's multi-year
study to improve the auditing profession's ability to detect fraud."'4 In
early 1993, the Public Oversight Board of the SEC Practice Section of
the AICPA concluded that
to a greater extent than it now does, the profession must accept responsibility for the detection of fraud by management. The profession
cannot, and it cannot be expected to, develop methods that will assure
that every fraud, no matter how cleverly contrived, will be unearthed
in the course of the audit, but it must develop means of increasing
significantly the likelihood of detecting fraud."
Later in 1993, the AICPA Auditing Standards Board formed a task force
to study SAS No. 53 and develop a new SAS that focused on financial
statement fraud."6

109. Reform Act sec. 301(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-I note (Effective Date); see aLso 143 CONG. REC.
S1412-01 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 1997) (letter from SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt to Sen. Wyden (Jan. 31,
1997)).
110. Reform Act sec. 301(a), § 10A, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1.
111. Reform Act sec. 301(a), § IOA(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(f).
112. See generallySAS No. 82, supranote 6.
113. AU,supra note 5, at § 317.08.
114. See Mancino,supra note 9, at 32.
115. PUBLIC OVERSIGirr BOARD OF THE SEC PRACTICE SECTION OF THE AICPA, supra note
10, at 42.
116. AMERICAN INSrrrUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, MEETING THE FINANCIAL
NEEDS OF THE FuruRt- A PUBuC COMMENT FROM THE ACCOUNING PROFESSION (1993).
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The AICPA had adopted SAS No. 53 in 1988. It required that the
auditor design the audit to provide "reasonable assurance" of detecting
material irregularities."" In exercising his professional skepticism, the
auditor was no longer permitted to assume honesty by management in
the absence of evidence to the contrary."8 SAS No. 53 stated that the
auditor "neither assumes that management is dishonest nor assumes unquestioned honesty.""' 9 It also made more explicit the requirement that in
developing an audit plan, an auditor consider factors that affect audit
risk." °
In May 1996, the Accounting Standards Board released an exposure
draft of a proposed SAS."' After reviewing comment letters, the draft
was .revised, and in November 1996, the ASB voted to issue SAS No.
82.22 It was adopted in February 1997.'"
SAS No. 82 provides clarification of the auditor's responsibility to
detect fraud. It does not change the auditor's responsibility to detect
fraud which is still framed by the key concepts of materiality and reasonable assurance.'2" However, Edmund Noonan, the chairman of the Accounting Standards Board and an audit partner at KPMG Peat Marwick,
in addressing an AICPA conference in December 1996, said: "If you
don't want to make changes to your practice, you're at grave risk.'"" He
described SAS No. 82 as "a free-standing, performance or field work
standard [that] is intended to drive auditor performance and drive it
hard."'' " At the same AICPA conference, Michael Sutton, the chief accountant of the SEC, stated that with the enactment of SAS No. 82,
auditors "'should not be able to skip lightly' over the issue of fraud or to
117. See Joseph L. Goldstein & Catherine Dixon, New Teeth for the Public's Watchdog: The
Expanded Role of the Independent Accountant in Detecting, Preventing, and Reporting Financial Frau4
44 Bus. LAw. 439,476 (1989).
118. See id
119. AU, supra note 5, at § 316.16.
120. Goldstein & Dixon, supra note 117, at 476-77.
121. Mancino, supra note 9, at 32.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. SAS No. 82, supra note 6, at app. A 2 (amending AU § 110, "Responsibilities and Functions
of the Independent Auditor"). This section provides:
The auditor has a responsibility to plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable
assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material misstatement,
whether caused by error or fraud. Because of the nature of audit evidence and the
characteristics of fraud, the auditor is able to obtain reasonable, but not absolute,
assurance that material misstatements are detected. The auditor has no responsibility to
plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance that misstatements, whether
caused by errors or fraud, that are not material to the financial statements are detected.
Id
125. Steven Burkholder, New FraudReporting Rules are Not Mere Clarification,ASB Chairman
Warns, 28 SEc. REG. & L REP. 1528,1528 (1996).
126. Id. at 1529 (alteration in the original). Burkholder writes that the chairman warned that "newly
enacted rules increasing the duties of auditors to detect and report fraud are not merely a clarification of
existing standards, but instead represent a raising of the bar that puts auditors at peril if ignored." Id at
1528.
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assert that it is not the mission of the audit to discover fraud that is material to the financial statements."'" Soon after the enactment of SAS No.
82, several knowledgeable commentators wrote that
this new SAS raised
'
the standard for an auditor's duty to detect fraud. 2
In contrast, according to Glenn Vice of the ASB, there is no change
in the duty to detect fraud. At an AICPA National Conference on Fraud
held in June 1996, he stated: "The proposed standard reaffirms the auditor's present responsibility--that is, to plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are
materially misstated."'"
The title to SAS No. 82 directly refers to fraud instead of the title to
SAS No. 53, its predecessor, which used the terms "errors" and "irregularities." The original standard, SAS No. 16 entitled "Errors or Irregularities," was issued by the AICPA in 1977.'" It established the basic
framework in which the auditor has the responsibility to: (1) plan his
examination to search for errors or irregularities that would have a material effect on the financial statements; (2) exercise an attitude of professional skepticism; and (3) evaluate internal
controls before placing reli31
ance thereon in conducting the audit.
SAS No. 82 concentrates on two types of misstatements: those
arising from intentional falsification of financial statements and those
arising from misappropriation or theft of assets. 2 It provides a more extensive and detailed listing of the warning signals that should alert an
auditor to the possibility of fraud than its predecessor, SAS No. 53. It
also provides more specific guidance as to the types of auditing procedures that the auditor should employ in response to the presence of an
increased risk of fraud.
a. FraudRisk Factors Under SAS No. 82
As part of the auditor's fraud risk assessment in designing the audit
procedures, the auditor must inquire of management to obtain its understanding of the risk of fraud.13 1 In addition, the auditor must document in

127. Id. at 1529 (quoting statement made by Michael Sutton, chief accountant of the SEC, during
AJCPA conference).
128. See Douglas R. Carmichael & James L Craig, Proposal to Say the "F" Word in Auditing
Standards, CPA J., June 1996, at 22, 22; Gary D. Zeune, Auditors Will Be Required to Detect Fraud,
Bus. CREDTr, Sept 1996, at 16.
129.

AICPA,

NATIONAL CONFERENCE

ON

FRAuD

(June 1996)

(visited Nov.

1.

1997)

<http://www.aicpa.org/members/div/auditstd/frconf~lm at 12 of 15>.
130. See AICPA, CODiCATION OF STATEmENUs ON AuDmNG STANDARDS, STATEMENT ON
AUDrING STANDARDS Pt. I(1995) (providing historical table).
131. AuDrTNG STANDARDS BoARD,STATEMENT ON AUDrTING STANDARDS No. 16, ERRORS OR
IRREGULARmES (1977), reprinted in AU, supra note 5, at § 337.
132. SAS No.82, supra note 6, at(112.
133. Id at Iff 12-13.
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his working papers "the assessment of the risk of material misstatement
due to fraud" and if, during the performance of the audit, that assessment
changes, the changed circumstances and the response also must be
documented.'"
SAS No. 82 states that fraud risk factors "cannot easily be ranked in
35

order of importance or combined into effective predictive models.'

However, it emphasizes the necessity to evaluate risk factors in combination." Unlike its predecessor, it distinguishes between risk factors
relating to fraudulent financial reporting and those relating to misappropriation of assets.' It also provides examples of specific responses to the
risk of fraudulent financial reporting in the areas of revenue recognition
and inventory,'" as well as examples 3of specific responses to an identified risk of misappropriation of assets. 1
Under SAS No. 53, risk factors relating to fraudulent financial reporting were grouped according to Management Characteristics, Operating and Industry Characteristics and Engagement Characteristics. SAS
No. 82 now sets forth more detailed examples arranged under similar,
but not identical, categories: Management's Characteristics and Influence
Over the Control Environment, Industry Conditions, and Operating
Characteristics and Financial Stability." These risk factors may provide
strong circumstantial evidence of management's conscious misbehavior
or recklessness which could establish the requisite scienter to support a
securities
fraud cause of action against either management or the
4
auditor.' '

In discussing risk factors relating to Management Characteristics,
SAS No. 82 lists specific indicators of management's motivation to engage in fraudulent financial reporting, such as when management compensation is tied to the achievement of aggressive financial targets. 5
Specific evidence that management had the motive and opportunity to
commit fraud will satisfy a plaintiff's fraud cause of action against either
management or the auditor.'" More emphasis is placed on risks arising
from management's failure to act appropriately with respect to internal
control and financial reporting.'" Furthermore, management's attempts to

134.
135.
136.
137.
assets).
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id.at J37.
1. at%21.
l
Compare id at

fl

16-17 (fraudulent financial reporting), with I 18-20 (misappropriation of

Id at%30.
Id at I 16(a)-(c).
Id at131.
See infra PartlI.
SAS No. 82, supra note 6,at %17(a).
See infra Part I.
SAS No.82, supra note 6,at$17(a).
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limit the scope of the auditor's work is another type of risk factor to be
taken into account by the auditor.'"
SAS No. 82 also sets forth specific examples of risk factors relating
to misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets.'" These factors
are grouped under the category of Susceptibility of Assets to Misappropriation and Controls." The auditor also may become aware of financial
pressures on employees or dissatisfaction on the part of employees,
which may bear on the risk of misappropriation of assets.'"
For example, in HerbertH. Post & Co. v. Sidney Bitterman Inc., 9
the jury rendered a verdict of $17.1 million against an accounting firm
for its accountant's malpractice due to his failure to discover an employee embezzlement of more than $3 million that occurred over a four
year period. The New York State Appellate Division subsequently reversed and remanded the case for a new trial largely due to procedural
errors.' 5 However, the substance of the accountant's defalcations is informative in relationship to SAS No. 82, especially since the damage
award was significant.
The defendant accounting firm may have avoided liability by examining management controls, or the lack thereof, as dictated by SAS
No. 82. The accounting firm could have inquired
of the elderly principals whether they had adequately evaluated the
employee they appointed to manage the import department. The accountants should have insisted that the company follow the required
procedures for check cashing. When the gap in the transaction documents became obvious, the accountants should have meaningfully inquired into the genuineness of the transactions. Instead the accountants looked the other way ....
b. Duty to Detect Fraudand Possibly Resign from the Audit
Under SAS No. 82
SAS No. 82 retains and expands upon the basic principle that if the
auditor believes that there has been fraud that is material to the financial
statements, he must discuss the matter with an "appropriate level of management that is at least one level above those involved and with senior
management."' 3 By requiring that any fraud that causes a material mis145.'Id
146.
l at 118.
147. Id at I 18(a), (b).
148. Jd at 120.
149. 639 N.Y.S.2d 329 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
150. Herbert H. Post & Co., 639 N.Y.S.2d at 331-32.
151. Id at 339.
152. Norman B. Amoff & Sue C. Jacobs, Accountants' and Employee Defalcations, N.Y. L.J., Apr.
8,1997, at 3,7 (discussing in detail the relationship of Herbert H. Post & Co. to SAS No. 82).
153. SAS No. 82, supra note 6, at 35(b).
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statement of the financial statements must be reported directly to the
audit committee of the board of directors, SAS No. 82 expands upon
SAS No. 53's requirement that only fraud involving senior management
should be reported to the board's audit committee.'"
SAS No. 82, however, maintains the AICPA's position that an
auditor is not required to disclose the existence of such fraud to third
parties and, in fact, is "precluded by the auditor's ethical or legal obligations of confidentiality unless the matter is reflected in the auditor's report."' Instead of requiring whistle blowing, SAS No. 82 promulgates
an opt out provision-where, if the auditor's evaluation of risk factors
and results of audit tests indicate that a significant risk of fraud exists,
"the auditor should consider withdrawing from the engagement and
communicating the reasons for withdrawal to the audit committee.""
With respect to illegal acts, however, SAS No. 82 provides that the
auditor may be required to disclose outside the client entity in circumstances such as "comply[ing] with certain legal and regulatory requirements."'' In a footnote to this paragraph, the SAS refers to the Reform
Act's required report to the SEC.' 8
2. SAS No. 54
Although SAS No. 54, entitled "Illegal Acts by Clients," covers the
auditor's responsibility for detection of illegal acts, it states that an audit
in accordance with GAAS normally "does not include audit procedures
specifically designed to detect illegal acts.' ' 9 In contrast, SAS No. 82
requires the auditor to make a fraud risk assessment in designing audit
procedures,"'5 and the Reform Act requires that audits of public companies' financial statements include "procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance of detecting illegal acts that would have a direct and
material effect on the determination of financial statement amounts.""'
According to SAS No. 54, whether an act is illegal "is a determination that is normally beyond the auditor's professional competence.""
SAS No. 54 distinguishes between (i) illegal acts that have a direct and
material effect on the financial statements, requiring a different method
of classification of a material balance such as tax laws and the determination of revenue earned under a government contract in which case the
auditor's responsibility for detection is the same as for fraud'63 and (ii)
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 38.
Id. at$40.
d at 36.
Id. at I40(a).
Id. at s 40(a) n.24.
AU, supranote5, at § 317.08.
SAS No. 82, supra note 6, at I1J
12-13.
Reform Act sec. 301(a), § IOA(a)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-I(a)(1) (Supp. I 1995).
AU, supra note 5,at § 317.03.
Id.
at §317.05.
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illegal acts that have a material but indirect effect on the financial statements, such as violations of laws or regulations that relate to the operating aspects of the company, like "securities [issuance and] trading, occupational safety and health, food and drug administration, environmental
protection, equal employment, price fixing or other antitrust
violations."" Violations of these laws ordinarily do not have a direct
impact on the financial statements but may be material because they expose the company to potential legal liability for damages, penalties and
fines.16

Since U.S. businesses are subject to so many laws and regulations
that, if violated, could lead to material consequences, it is questionable
whether an audit can be designed to provide reasonable assurance of
detecting all illegal acts that may have a material effect on financial
statements. "As a practical matter auditors have little chance of detecting
most illegal acts unless informed of them by the client" or by available
corporate documents which disclose the existence of a government investigation or enforcement proceeding.'"
SAS No. 54, like SAS No. 82 with respect to fraud, provides that if
the auditor concludes that the illegal act is material to the financial
statements and has not been properly accounted for or disclosed, he must
express a qualified or adverse opinion. 67 If the auditor is precluded from
obtaining the necessary information to evaluate whether an illegal act has
occurred, the auditor normally should disclaim, i.e., not render an opinion.'" The auditor should resign if the client refuses to accept the auditor's report as qualified, adverse, or disclaimed.'"
Regarding fraud, SAS No. 54 takes the position that the auditor ordinarily has no responsibility to disclose illegal acts to third parties, "unless the matter affects his opinion on the financial statements."'"0 The
auditor can withdraw from the engagement if management fails to make
appropriate disclosures in the financial statements without directly reporting the misconduct to the SEC or to the public. However, as discussed above, SAS No. 82 refers to the Reform Act's requirement of
disclosure of illegal acts.
The Reform Act now requires an auditor to determine whether the
directors have taken appropriate remedial actions to assess the consequences of actual or likely violations of numerous administrative rules
and federal regulations, including those issued by the Federal Trade

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id.
at§ 317.06.
1& at §§ 317.05-.07.
Mancino, supra note 9, at 36.
AU, supra note 5, at § 317.18.
Id.
at §317.19.
1&at § 317.20.
Id. at §317.23.
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Commission, Federal Drug Administration, Occupational Safety and
Health Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency. The
auditor will also have to make similar assessments concerning violations
of state, local, and foreign laws.
Senator Ron Wyden, one of the members of the congressional
committee that drafted the new whistle blower provision of the Reform
Act, stated that SAS No. 82
takes an important step forward by making clear for the first time an
auditor's responsibility to detect material fraud in financial statements
and by offering various fraud risk factors to be considered in planning
and performing all audits. The new revised SAS, read in conjunction
with the AICPA's SAS No. 54 relating to an auditor's responsibility
to detect illegal acts, is not only consistent with Section 10A [of the
Reform Act] but also promotes the intent of that provision to put procedures in place to help detect fraud early.'
SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt also stated, with respect to whether
new SAS No. 82 and existing SAS No. 54 are consistent with the purpose and intent of the Reform Act, that "[w]e believe that both these
standards improve the ability of auditors to detect management fraud and
are consistent with the purposes of Section 10A."''
Auditors claim to be confused about what, if anything, they should
do to detect illegal acts. Though auditors must follow the strictures of the
Reform Act, they also have an ethical obligation to follow GAAS.
In a 1994 judicial decision, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that an auditor did not have a duty to investors to disclose deficiencies in
the company's internal controls in its audit report because he relied in
good faith on GAAS." However, other courts have
held that GAAS are
74
care.'
of
standard
auditor's
the
of
determinative
not
Patrick McDonnell, vice chairman of Business Assurance Services
at Coopers & Lybrand, stated, "[i]f auditors follow the [AICPA] rules,
but miss the fraud, one could argue that they still have protection from
lawsuits,"'' 5 but they also may not as indicated by current litigation.

171. 143 CoNG. REc. S1412 (daily ed. Feb. 13,1997) (statement of Sen. Wyden).
172. Id (letter from Arthur Levitt, SEC Chairman, to Sen. Ron Wyden (Jan. 31,1997)).
173. See Monroe v. Hughes, 31 F.3d 772,775-76 (9th Cir. 1994).
174. See, e.g., Hochfelder v. Emst & Emst, 503 F.2d 1100, 1113 (7th Cir. 1974) C"[WIe recognize
that we are not constrained to accept faulty standards of practice otherwise generally accepted in an
industry or profession."), rev'd on other grounds, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein,
Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112,122 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), affid in part and rev'd in part, 540 F.2d 27
(2d Cir. 1976); see aLso Maduff Mortgage v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, 779 P.2d 1083,1086 (Or. Ct. App.
1989) (concluding that GAAS is useful in determining the standard of car for an accountant, but not
contolling).
175. Elizabeth MacDonald, Auditors are Ending up Between a Rock and a Hard Place over
Securities Law, WALL ST. J., Dec. 24,1996, at Cl.
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For example, under the Reform Act, it may be difficult for an auditor to assess the "materiality" of an illegal act, its possible effect on the
issuer's financial statements, or the likelihood that the illegal act has actually occurred. Similarly, SAS No. 82 lists fraud risk factors and SAS
No. 53 required that audits provide "reasonable assurance" of detecting
material irregularities, concepts which will be susceptible to judicial interpretation. These are necessarily gray areas which may have the net
effect of
tying up the auditor in expensive litigation in instances where hindsight shows that the effect of a fraudulent accounting practice was
more or less substantial than the auditor's judgment originally forecast.

Auditors [may] be placed in the impossible position of acting not
merely as detectives, obliged to seek out and report illegal acts, but
clairvoyants, open to liability for a failure to report acts that seem
prospectively to pose no material consequence to the financial statements of the issuer.'76
Besides developing an awareness of prior judicial precedents, accounting
firms should plan ahead by creating internal management strategies for
dealing with auditor liability under the Reform Act and professional
auditing standards.'"
III. PROVING AUDITOR FRAUD
A. The Scienter Requirement
The scienter'7 ' requirement is currently a controversial element in
lawsuits brought against auditors, as well as others, under the Reform
Act for violations of section 10(b), Rule lOb-5, and professional auditing
standards. The Reform Act does not define scienter or indicate the standards for alleging scienter, and post-Reform Act judicial decisions have
formulated different interpretations of how the scienter requirement can
be satisfied. Furthermore, various sections of the Reform Act reflect a
congressional ambiguity concerning the scienter requirement. For example, the Reform Act's safe harbor rules for statutorily defined forward-

176.
177.

Brodsky, supranote 48, at 36.
Harvey L. Pitt et al., More Than "ClassicalGAAS": Audits and Corporate Illegality Under the
Litigation Reform Act, in 28TH ANNUAL INSTrTi ON SECUREs RErULATiON, at 269, 273-81 (PLI
Corp. Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 962,1996).
178. Scienter "is frnuently used to signify the defendant's guilty knowledge." BLACK'S LAW
DICrnONARY 1345 (6th ed. 1990).
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looking statements" provide that "no liability will attach under the Reform Act in a private action unless the plaintiff proves actual knowledge
of the false or misleading nature of the statement on the part of a natural
person making the statement,"'" or on the part of an executive officer
approving the statement made on behalf of a business entity.'"' In its joint
and several liability section, the Reform Act restricts a defendant's liability to an amount corresponding to its proportionate degree of fault if
the defendant did not act "knowingly."'1'
Prior to the Reform Act, the Supreme Court, in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, Inc.," held that "scienter," which it defined as "a mental
state embracing intent to deceive, mampulate, or defraud,"'" was a prerequisite to fraud liability under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. The
Hochfelder Court expressly rejected plaintiff's contention that the defendant's accountants could be liable under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
based solely upon their negligence.'" However, the Court left open the
question of whether recklessness could satisfy the newly-created scienter
requirement: "In certain areas of the law recklessness is considered to be
a form of intentional conduct for purposes of imposing liability for some
act. We need not address here the question whether in some circumstances reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liability under section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5."''
After Hochfelder, the lower courts were left with the task of determining whether reckless conduct is sufficient to satisfy the scienter requirement of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. The Supreme Court has not
subsequently addressed this issue.
In a recent Supreme Court case, United States v. O'Hagan" the
Court upheld the federal "misappropriation theory" for prosecuting insider trading cases under section 10(b) and Rule l0b-5." The misappropriation theory of insider trading is broader than classical insider trading
liability as it imposes fraud liability on any individual who misappropriates material, non-public information by breaching a fiduciary duty and

179. Section 102 of the Reform Act created a safe harbor provision for forward-looking information
by adding section 27A to the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2 (Supp. 1 1995) and by adding
section 21E to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 u-5 (Supp. I 1995).
180. Reform Act sec. 102(a), § 27A(c)(1)(B)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(c)(1)(B)(i) (emphasis added);
Reform Act sec. 102(b), § 21E(c)(1)(B)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(B)(i) (emphasis added).
181. Reform Act sec. 102(a), § 27A(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(c)(1)(B)(ii)(I); 15 U.S.C. § 78u5(c)Xl)(B)(ii)(I).

182. Reform Act sec. 201(a), § 21D(g)(2)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(g)(2)(A).
183. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
184. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193 n.12.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. 117 S. CL 2199 (1997).
188. O'Hagan,117 S.CL at2213-14.
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uses that information in a securities transaction.'89 The O'HaganCourt, in
its discussion of the misappropriation theory, emphasized the continued
importance of the scienter requirement in securities litigation:
To establish a criminal violation of Rule 1Ob-5, the government must
prove that a person 'willfully' violated the provision.' 90In addition the
statute's requirement of the presence of culpable intent as a necessary
element of the offense does much to destroy any force in the argument that application of the [statute] in circumstances such as
O'Hagan's is unjust.'9'
It has been suggested that O'Hagan'srequirement that the government establish a clear intent to defraud in criminal securities fraud prosecutions may raise the "level of scienter enormously ....Now, when the
SEC tries to deal with the lower standard of intent, recklessness, they
may find O'Hagan comes back to bite them."'
Since Hochfelder, commentators and ten courts of appeal have concluded that a reckless misrepresentation or omission satisfies the scienter
requirement. 3 In addition to wide ranging judicial support for the concept that recklessness satisfies the Hochfelder scienter requirement,19
there is authority under the tort of common law fraud for this proposition.' Accountants have unsuccessfully attempted to convince the courts
that recklessness is not enough to prove scienter. The courts have con-

189. John C. Coffee, Jr., In 'O'Hagan.' The Supreme Court Gets a Second Chance to Adopt, and
Define the Scope of. SEC's 'Misappropriation Theory' of Insider Trading, NATL.L.J., Feb. 17, 1997, at
B5.
190. O'Hagan, 117 S.Ct. at 2214 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a)).
191. Id (quoting Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337,342 (1952)).
192. Dominic Bencivenga, The Right Set of Facts: 'O'Hagan' Court Affirms SEC Rule-Making
Power, N.Y. LJ., July 3, 1997, at 5, 43 (quoting Harvey L Pitt, law partner in Fried, Frank, Harris,
Shriver & Jacobson).
193. Kevin R. Johnson, Liability for Reckless Misrepresentationsand Omissions Under Section
10(B) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934, 59 U. CN. L. REv. 667, 673-74 n.22 (1991).
194. See Armstrong et al., supranote 38, at 980-81 n.38 (citing the following cases in support of the
recklessness standard for meeting the scienter requirement SEC v. Steadman, 967 F.2d 636, 641-42
(D.C. Cir. 1992); Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1569 (9th Cir. 1990); In re Phillips
Petroleum Sec. Litig., 881 F.2d 1236, 1244 (3rd. Cir. 1989); McDonald v. Alan Bush Brokerage Co., 863
F.2d 809, 814-15 (11th Cir. 1989); Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1117-18 (10th Cir. 1982);
Hoffman v. Estabrook & Co., 587 F.2d 509, 517 (1st Cir. 1978); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co.,
570 F.2d 38, 47 (2d Cir. 1978); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir.
1977); In re American Continental Corp./Lincoln Savings and Loan Sec. Iitig.,
794 F. Supp. 1424, 1434
(D. Ariz. 1992)); see also Paul Vizearrondo,Jr. & Andrew C. Houston, LiabilitiesUnder Sections 11, 12,
15 and 17 of the Securities Act of 1933 and Sections 10, 18 and 20 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, in UNDERSTANDING THE SEcutmES LAws 1996, at 585, 645 (PU Corp. Law & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 956, 1996) (providing survey of cases to illustrate that only the Fourth Circuit holds
that recklessness will not satisfy the scienter requirement of Rule lOb-5; all other circuits and several
district courts in the Fourth Circuit require either general or severe recklessness).
195. See Armstrong etal., supra note 38, at 986 (discussing history of common-law fraud in the
context of securities litigation).
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sistently refused to strengthen their scienter requirements by eliminating
recklessness.'"
The recklessness standard in relationship to accountants has been
evaluated in various ways. Some courts define accounting recklessness
as accounting practices that are such "an extreme departure from the
standards of ordinary care"" or "so deficient that the audit amounted to
no audit at all."'"8 Other courts find recklessness in a failure to investigate
the obvious or doubtful.' Some courts allow gross departures from
GAAP or GAAS as merely negligent actions which do not meet the scienter standard,' and other courts conclude that this same conduct may
prove reckless enough to establish scienter.2 ° Even if accountants heed
the professional auditing standards set forth in SAS No. 82 and SAS No.
54, it is not clear whether or not this will absolve or insulate them from
securities fraud liability in all jurisdictions, although "auditors who do
adhere to the new standard [SAS No. 82] but fail to detect a material
fraud will be in a better position to avoid liability on the grounds that
SAS No. 82 provides a 'safe haven."' The Reform Act, together with
its legislative history, left "the definition of scienter [intent] an open
question for the courts to work out."2'
B. PleadingRequirements
The Reform Act's failure to codify the definition of scienter has
focused judicial attention upon the requirements for pleading fraud as a
means of clarifying the conduct that gives rise to scienter. Already there
exist several types of post-Reform Act cases that differ in their standards
for pleading scienter and in their interpretation of the Reform Act's

pleading requirements."
Rule lOb-5's scienter requirement is now being measured against
the Reform Act's new pleading section enacted by Congress to

196. Coopers & Lybrand pursued this argument unsuccessfully in In re Phar-Mor Inc. Sec. Litig.,
892 F. Supp. 679,685 (W.D. Pa. 1995).
197. SEC v. Price Waterhouse, 797 F. Supp. 1217, 1240 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (quoting Sundstrand
Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033,1045 (7th Cir. 1977)).
198. Price Waterhouse, 797 F. Supp. at 1240.
199. E.g., Axel Johnson, Inc. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 762 F. Supp. 599,601 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
200. E.g., In re Software Toolworks, Inc. Sec. Litig., 50 F.3d 615, 627-28 (9th Cir. 1994); In re InStore Advertising Sec. Litig., 878 F. Supp. 645, 648-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); see Yankwitt & Moldovan,
supra note 17, at 4 & n.21. See generally id (providing a further discussion of how courts have been
inconsistent in their application of a recklessness/scienter standard in securities fraud litigation against
accountants).
201. E.g., Ades v. Deloitte & Touche, 799 F. Supp. 1493 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); see Yankwitt &
Moldovan, supra note 17, at 4 & n.22.
202. Robert Sidorsky, Independent Auditor's Consideration of Fraud,N.Y. LJ., Jan. 24,1997, at 1,
32.
203. Karen Donovan, Securities Law Review on Tap, NAT'I. LJ., Apr. 14,1997, at A6 (alteration in
original) (quoting Donald C. Langevoort of Vanderbilt University School of Law).
204. See infra notes 220-61 and accompanying text.
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strengthen existing pleading requirements by requiring plaintiffs to plead
with particularity the facts giving rise to the allegations of fraud. One
year after the Reform Act's enactment, lawyers report that they have
altered their pleading strategies to meet the Reform Act's heightened
pleading requirement by making more detailed and specific allegations
so that their complaints will survive motions to dismiss. °'
The Reform Act requires that in securities fraud actions the plaintiffs "complaint shall, with respect to each act or omission alleged to
violate this title, state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind." This
represents a departure from the pre-Reform Act standard of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 9(b) which requires that fraud be alleged with particularity, but expressly allows "[m]alice, intent, knowledge and other
condition of mind of a person [to] be averred generally." 2
The Reform Act's legislative history indicates in its House conference report two major drawbacks to Rule 9(b).' ° Rule 9(b) did "not prevent.., abuse of the securities laws by private litigants" and "courts of
appeals have interpreted Rule 9(b)'s [broad and lenient pleading] requirement in conflicting ways, creating distinctly different standards
amongst the circuits. ' ' For example, the Seventh Circuit has established
that a sufficient level of factual support for a Rule 1Ob-5 claim is found
when the circumstances of fraud are pled "in detail" which "means the
who, what, when, where, and how: the first paragraph of any newspaper
story.""' However, some courts have interpreted Rule 9(b) to allow
plaintiffs to generally allege fraud without setting forth specific facts in
support of their allegations.2 1 ' The Reform Act's new pleading requirement was intended to curtail the filing of meritless lawsuits by establishing more stringent and uniform pleading standards.22
The pre-Reform Act pleading standard, set forth in Rule 9(b), was
given its strictest interpretation by the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit required a plaintiff to plead facts sufficient to raise a "strong infer-

205. Dominic Bencivenga, Litigation Re-Formed Lawyers Report on 'Year )' Under Securities Act,
N.Y. LJ., Jan. 16, 1997,at 5.
206. Reform Act sec. 101(b), § 21D(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(b)(2) (Supp. 11995).
207. FED. R. Cxv. P. 9(b).
208. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41(1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,740.
209. id.
210. Dileo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990); see also Williams v. WMX
Techs., 112 F.3d 175, 177-78 (5th Cir. 1997), petition for cert. filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3170 (U.S. Aug. 20,
1997) (No. 97-333).
211. Thisis true in the Ninth and Sixth Circuits. See Fecht v. Price Co., 70 F.3d 1078,1082-83 (9th
Cir. 1995); In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F3d 1541, 1546-49 (9th Cir. 1994); In re Rospatch Sec.
Litig., 760 F. Supp. 1239, 1253 (W.D. Mich. 1991); Edward Brodsky, Scienter Under the Reform Act of
1995, N.Y. LJ., Jan. 8,1997, at 3,3 n.5.
212. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,740.
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ence of fraudulent intent. ' 21 3 This "strong inference" of fraudulent intent
could be "established either (a) by alleging facts to show that defendants
had both the motive and opportunity to commit fraud ["motive and opportunity" test], or (b) by alleging facts that constitute strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness ["circumstantial evidence" test]. 't4
The difficulty in applying the Second Circuit's stringent pleading
standard, particularly the motive and opportunity test, is demonstrated by
the case law which has led to "arbitrary line-drawing by the courts. 12 5 In
some situations where a plaintiff alleges that the defendant gained personal benefits from inflated stock prices, the motive and opportunity test
to commit fraud has been satisfied, 6 whereas in others such evidence has
been found insufficient.
In In re Time Warner, Inc. Securities Litigation, the Second Circuit
found a motive to commit fraud adequately pled where plaintiffs alleged
that the defendants artificially maintained a higher stock price in order to
raise capital more easily.1 8 In contrast, in San Leandro Emergency Medical Group Profit Sharing Plan,the same court held that plaintiffs had not
adequately pled sufficient motive to commit fraud by alleging that defendant maintained high stock prices in order to issue bonds because "if
scienter could be pleaded on this basis alone, virtually every company in
the United States that experiences a downturn in stock price could be
forced to defend securities fraud actions."' 9
The Reform Act's pleading standards have created a judicial split
over what types of allegations are sufficient to support the scienter requirement in a securities fraud claim.2 ° Three types of post-Reform Act

213. See Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994).
214. Shields, 25 F.3d at 1128; see also San Leandro Emergency Medical Group Profit Sharing Plan
9 F.3d 259,
v. Philip Morris Co., 75 F.3d 801, 813 (2d Cir. 1996); In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig.,
268-69 (2d Cir. 1993); O'Brien v. National Property Analysts Partners, 936 F.2d 674, 676-77 (2d Cir.
1991), affg O'Brien v. Price Waterhouse, 740 F. Supp. 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (affirming the district
court's dismissal after implicitly recognizing that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the circumstantial evidence

test).
215. Brodsky, supranote 48, at 3.
216. Time Warner, Inc., 9 F.3d at 269-70; Hallett v. L & Fung Ltd., No. 95 Civ. 8917, 1996 WL
487952, at *3 & n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 1996); Polycast Tech. Corp. v. Uniroyal Inc., 792 F. Supp. 244
(S.D.N.Y. 1992); see also Brodsky, supra note 48, at 3 & n.21.
217. San Leandro Emergency Med. Group Profit Sharing Plan, 75 F.3d at 813-14; Acito v.
IMCERA Group, Inc., 47 F.3d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Brodsky, supra note 48, at 3 & n.22.
218. Time Warner,Inc., 9 F.3d at 269.
219. San Leandro Emergency Med Group, 75 F.3d at 814 (quoting Acito, 47 F:3d at 54); see also
Brodsky, supra note 48, at 3 (providing a further discussion of the Hallett and Acito cases to illustrate the
difficulties experienced by courts in determining when the motive and opportmity test has been
adequately pled to support the scienter requirement).
220. William R. Maguire & Reid A. Muoio, Securities LitigationReform: The FirstAnniversary,
N.Y. L., Dec. 12, 1996, at 2.
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cases have evolved: 2' first, cases holding that pleading scienter under the
Reform Act is satisfied by establishing reckless conduct and the motive
and opportunity to commit fraud;" second, cases rejecting the recklessness standard and holding that scienter is only proven by pleading a deliberate and conscious intent to commit fraud;'m and third, cases holding
that although the recklessness standard is still applicable, the motive and
opportunity test does not satisfy the Reform Act's heightened pleading
requirements." '
Some courts have held that allegations of reckless behavior or motive and opportunity may be sufficient in relation to corporate insiders to
prove an intent to commit fraud.'m In Marksman Partners,L.P. v. Chantal PharmaceuticalCorp.,' a federal district court in California held that
the Reform Act did not clearly eliminate the Second Circuit's motive and
opportunity test since this was not explicitly done in the statute and this
test remains "consistent with both the language and purpose of the [Reform Act]" and is a "suitable standard to employ. 227
The Marksman court, as well as other courts, determined that the
Second Circuit pleading standard survived passage of the Reform Act.m
It refers to the Reform Act's legislative history which states that "[t]he
conference committee language is based in part on the pleading standard
of the Second Circuit" which is "regarded as the most stringent pleading
standard. The Second Circuit requirement is that the plaintiff state facts
with particularity, and that these facts, in turn, must
give rise to a 'strong
29
inference' of the defendant's fraudulent intent.
The SEC also supports this position as it did in an amicus brief supporting the plaintiff's complaint in In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Securities
Litigation (Silicon Graphics1),m wherein it asserted that although Congress intended to adopt a stricter procedural pleading standard in securities fraud cases, Congress did not intend to substantively change securities laws by eliminating recklessness as a basis for scienter. 3' As of Janu-

221. Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff, Scienter Requirement Under Securities Litigation
Reform, N.Y. LJ., July 17, 1997, at 5 (recognizing and discussing the three post-Reform Act approaches
to scienter).
222. See infra notes 225-32 and accompanying text.
223. See infra notes 233-48 and accompanying text.
224. See infra notes 249-57 and accompanying text.
225. E.g., Zeid v. Kimberley, 930 F. Supp. 431,437-38 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Marksman Partners, LP.
v. Chantal Pharmaceutical Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297, 1310, 1313 (C.D. Cal 1996).
226. Marksman Parmers, LP., 927 F. Supp. at 1297.
227. Id at 1312.
228. Marksman, 927 F. Supp. at 1311; see, e.g., Zeid, 930 F. Supp. at 434.
229. Marksman, 927 F. Supp. at 1311 (citing H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995), reprinted
in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,740).
230. No. C96-0393, 1996 WL 664639 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 1996) [hereinafter Silicon Graphics 1].
231. Donovan, supra note 203, at A6 (discussing the SEC's amicus brief filed in Silicon Graphics
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ary 1997, out of seven courts that have addressed the new pleading standard, six courts have concluded that the Reform Act simply adopted the
Second Circuit's rule that a strong inference of fraud is adequately pled if
the complaint pleads specific facts establishing circumstantial evidence
of reckless or conscious behavior or a motive and opportunity to commit
fraud.232
Other courts have interpreted the Reform Act as eliminating recklessness as a basis for scienter, requiring instead that scienter be proven
by evidence of a conscious or deliberate intent, rather than a motive and
opportunity, to commit fraud under more stringent pleading standards
than those provided for by the Second Circuit.13 This position was reflected in Silicon Graphics f" where the District Court of Northern California, after a detailed review of the Reform Act's legislative history,
concluded that Congress did not intend to adopt the Second Circuit's
scienter pleading standard."3
The Silicon Graphics I court decided that Congress intended to
adopt a stricter scienter pleading requirement requiring plaintiffs to allege conscious or intentional misconduct, or a deliberate intent to deceive
or actual knowledge by the defendant.' In the Silicon Graphics I case,
the court dismissed, with leave to file an amended complaint, the plaintiff's original securities fraud complaint, which alleged that the corporate
officers sold stock despite their knowledge that public statements concerning their company's revenue growth were false."
Recently in In Re Silicon Graphics,Inc. Securities Litigation"s (Silicon Graphics II), decided May 23, 1997, Judge Smith, of the federal
district court in San Francisco, dismissed the amended complaint, ruling
that under the Reform Act's heightened pleading standards plaintiffs had
not adequately alleged the details of the company's negative internal
reports 9 and that "recklessness" in issuing inaccurate reports was insufficient to hold corporate officers liable.2" Judge Smith dismissed plaintiff's amended complaint, ruling that pleading "deliberate recklessness"
would meet the Reform Act's higher standard of "a strong inference of
knowing or intentional misconduct." '' As one commentator noted in
reference to Judge Smith's decision in Silicon Graphics II, "Congress

232. See Grundfest & Perino, supra note 21, at 24-27 (discussing the seven cases that addressed the
new pleading standard as of January 1997).
233. See Block & Hoff, supra note 221, at 5 (discussing cases adopting the more stringent pleading
standards).
234. Silicon Graphics1, 1996 WL 664639, at *5.
235. Id. at *5-*6 & n.4.
236. Id. at *6-*7.
237. d. at *16.
238. 970 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. Cal. 1997) [hereinafter Silicon GraphicsI1].
239. Silicon Graphics1I, 970 F. Supp. at 767.
240. Id. at 757.
241.
id.
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intended plaintiffs to show harder factual evidence when bringing cases
rather than relying on secondhand information and beliefs based on that
information, which has been the foundation of such suits in the past."2 2"
Silicon Graphics11 clearly rejects mere recklessness as the scienter standard as well as the motive and opportunity test for pleading scienter. "3
Silicon Graphics H advocates a "deliberate recklessness" scienter standard which must be pled through evidence of intentional, conscious or
deliberate misconduct sufficient to raise a strong inference of fraud.' "
The plaintiffs plan to appeal Judge Smith's ruling to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 5 An appellate court ruling in this closely watched
case is expected to provide the first appellate decision concerning the
future of the recklessness standard and the scope of the scienter pleading
requirements under the Reform Act.
Both Silicon Graphics decisions reiterated that if Congress had intended to adopt the Second Circuit's approach it would have done so
clearly." They refer to the conference report which states that the "Conference Committee intends to strengthen existing pleading requirements,
it does not intend to codify the Second Circuit's case law interpreting this
pleading standard" and "[flor this reason, the Conference Report chose
not to include in the pleading standard certain language relating to motive, opportunity, or recklessness."" Although Congress did not adequately define a new scienter or pleading standard, the Reform Act may
indicate its intent to go beyond rules already in effect.4 9 Even President
Clinton, in his veto of the Reform Act, noted that in his view the legislative history indicated that Congress sought to adopt a more stringent
pleading standard than that of the Second Circuit.'
Yet another judicial perspective on pleading scienter was declared
by Judge Raskoff of the Southern District of New York in In re Baesa
242. Paul Beckett, Silicon GraphicsGains Dismissalof Suit Alleging Securities Fraud,WAIL ST.
J., May 30, 1997, at B2; see Silicon Graphics I, 970 F. Supp. at 763-64. In finding that the plaintiffs
failed to adequately allege the details of the company's negative internal reports under the Reform Act's
heightened pleading standards, the court noted that "[t]hese allegations should include the titles of the
reports, when they were prepared, to whom they were directed, their content, and the sources from which
plaintiffs obtained this information." Id. at 764.
243. See Silicon GraphicsI1,970 F. Supp. at 757.
244. Id. at 757. See generally Brodsky, supra note 48, at 3.
245. Beckett, supra note 242, at B2 (noting statement by Bill Lerach, a partner at the law firm
representing the plaintiffs).
246. Silicon Graphics11, 970 F. Supp. at 756; Silicon Graphics I, No. C 96-0393, 1996 WL 664639,
at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 1996).
247. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41(1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,740.
248. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 48 n.23 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 747
n.23.
249. Brodsky, supranote 211, at 3.
250. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995--Veto Message from the President of the
United States, reprintedin 141 CONG. REc. H15214-06 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1995). Congress overrode the
veto on December 22, 1995. 141 CONG. REc. D1507 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1995).
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Securities Litigation.f' Judge Raskoff found that the Reform Act did not
increase the scienter requirement for securities fraud beyond the recklessness standard because "'recklessness', in its classic formulation, describes a conscious state of mind that is inherently deceptive, i.e., a conscious and purposeful disregard of the truth of a known risk." 2 Judge
Raskoff also held that pleading only motive and opportunity is no longer
sufficient for proving an inference of scienter under the Reform Act."3
Instead, the pleadings must set forth sufficient particularized information
to raise a strong inference of the required scienter." ' Based upon this
formulation, the Baesa court dismissed plaintiff's complaint due to the
lack of factual support for plaintiff's allegations that the defendants had
knowledge of the fraud.
The Baesa ruling runs counter to the Silicon cases which elevated
the scienter requirement to a deliberate recklessness standard. Furthermore, another federal judge in New York ruled otherwise in Norwood
Venture Corp. v. Converse Inc.,' holding that Congress intended to
adopt a higher scienter requirement requiring a plaintiff to plead defendant's knowing misrepresentation." The First Circuit in Friedberg v.
DiscreetLogic, Inc."8 recently adopted a conscious behavior approach to
pleading scienter which is consistent with the Silicon approach. '
These different judicial standards for pleading scienter under the
Reform Act reflect the inherent ambiguities within the statute. Congress's failure to define a clear standard for pleading and proving scienter impede "the Reform Act's further objective of establishing uniform
and more stringent pleading requirements with respect to the scienter
element of [section] 10(b)."' Until the various courts of appeals formulate a clear scienter standard, possibly with the Supreme Court's assistance, this standard "will remain confused and inconsistently applied
among the federal district courts."'"
IV.

CONCLUSION

Accountants may believe that the new pleading requirements will
curtail litigation against them but that remains to be seen. For example,
plaintiffs' attorneys may cite the auditor's new duty under the Reform
Act to detect and disclose illegal acts to support their securities fraud

251. 969 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
252. Baesa Sec. Utig., 969 F. Supp. at 241.
253. Id. at 242.
254. d
255. The Baesa plaintiffs were given thirty days to replead their complaint. Id. at 243.
256. 959 F. Supp. 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
257. Norwood Venture Corp., 959 F. Supp. at 208.
258. 959 F. Supp. 42 (D. Mass. 1997).
259. Friedberg, 959 F. Supp. at 50.
260. Block & Hoff, supra note 221, at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted).
261. Id.
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allegations which now must be pled with factual particularity. Plaintiffs
may allege that an auditor's failure to detect fraudulent or illegal acts
demonstrates the requisite scienter or recklessness to sustain a primary
section 10(b) or Rule lOb-5 fraud liability claim. 2 In fact, recent successful federal securities lawsuits against accountants alleging direct
primary
fraud violations may fuel future litigation under the Reform
263
Act.
However, in one post-Reform Act case, Duncan v. Pencer,2" a securities fraud complaint which had been lodged against the accounting firm
of Coopers & Lybrand, was dismissed after being evaluated under the
Second Circuit's motive and opportunity and circumstantial evidence
pleading standards rather than the heightened pleading requirements of
the Reform Act.' In Duncan, the plaintiffs alleged that Coopers & Lybrand had a motive to commit fraud due to its desire to maintain a profitable business relationship with the defendant corporation and continue
receiving its professional fees." Therefore, the complaint alleged that
Coopers falsified corporate financial statements regarding profitability
causing investors to buy stock at inflated prices and enabling insiders to
sell their stock at inflated market prices. 2" The Duncan court dismissed
this motive argument, stating that it is "highly unlikely" to assume that
any accounting firm would "knowingly condone a client's fraud in order
to preserve a fee that, at best, is an infinitesimal percentage of its annual
revenues, and by doing so, jeopardize its reputation and.. . subject itself
to potential damages literally tens of thousands of times as large as its
fees...."'
Numerous courts have discredited the argument that every time a
professional is paid and then sued for securities fraud a finding of scienter can be made.' In discussing the fraud complaint, the Duncan court
also held that the circumstantial evidence test of conscious misbehavior
or recklessness was not satisfied by summarily alleging GAAP violations
without making supporting allegations of fraudulent intent.2 70 The fact
262. Lisa S. Kahn & Laura M. Metcalfe, Accountants, No Longer at Risk of Being Suedfor Aiding
and Abetting Securities Law Violations, Have Recently Been Found Directly Liable for Their Clients'
Fraud, NAT'L LJ., May 20, 1996, at B6.
263. Id. (referring to the Coopers & LybrandlPhar-Mor Inc. case where a federal jury found the
auditors liable, see Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 928 F. Supp. 557, 559-60 (W.D.
Pa. 1996) (discussing scope of appropriate damages after a finding of liability), and the Deloitte &
Touche case where a jury found the accounting firm liable for over $81 million, see Robbins v. Koger
Properties, Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1445-46 (reversing jury finding because plaintiff failed to establish the
loss causation element of Rule 1Ob-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1997)).
264. No. 94 Civ. 0321, 1996 WL 19043, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18,1996).
265. Duncan, 1996WL 19043, at*10-*11.
266. Id. at *9.
267. Id. at *11-*12.
268.
269.
270.

Id. at *10.
See, e.g., Yankwitt & Moldovan, supra note 17, at 4.
Duncan, 1996 WL 19043, at * 10.
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that Coopers violated a basic and fundamental accounting principle, i.e.,
giving someone money as an expense, not an asset, does not mean that
Coopers necessarily acted recklessly and does not satisfy the requirement
to plead fraud with particularity and circumstantial evidence. 7 '
The Reform Act has not clarified either the substantive or procedural issues pertaining to the recklessness/scienter requirement in federal
securities fraud litigation. Auditors continue to be named as defendants
in federal securities lawsuits but face uncertainties as the courts continue
to grapple with what constitutes fraud within the accounting context. The
Reform Act has created a duty for auditors to report illegal acts but has
insulated such reports from private causes of action. However, accountants remain susceptible to private causes of action for fraud and illegal
acts not included within their reports to the SEC. Such outside fraud or
illegal acts may be sufficient to meet the Reform Act's heightened
pleading standards.
Despite the Reform Act, the courts, almost without exception, continue to apply the Second Circuit's amorphous motive and opportunity
test and circumstantial evidence test. The question remains whether an
auditor's failure to report significant fraudulent and illegal acts could
provide sufficient circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior and
recklessness or motive and opportunity to support a Rule 1Ob-5 cause of
action. The professional auditing standards of SAS No. 82 and SAS No.
54 create a duty to consider fraud and illegal acts in the audit process. It
is now up to the judiciary to determine whether these professional standards will be a benchmark for alleging auditor fraud within the federal
securities law context. Until now the case law has been inconsistent. It
remains to be seen whether these professional standards, in concert with
the Reform Act, will stimulate a more unified approach to auditor fraud
liability.
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